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ENFORCING ARBITRATION OF FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAW CLAIMS: THE EFFECT OF DEAN WITTER
REYNOLDS, INC. v. BYRD
When investors open accounts with securities brokers, they usu-
ally sign a standard brokerage contract. These contracts generally
contain an arbitration agreement,1 in which the investor forfeits
the right to sue the broker by agreeing to submit any disputes to
binding arbitration. Although agreements to arbitrate future dis-
putes generally are enforceable under the United States Arbitra-
tion Act,2 federal courts have been unwilling to compel arbitration
when an investor alleges violations of federal securities laws. In
particular, courts have permitted investors to sue brokers for viola-
tions of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 and
rule 10b-5 4 despite contrary terms in the arbitration agreement.
1. A representative agreement reads:
It is agreed that any controversy between us arising out of. . . this agreement
shall be submitted to arbitration conducted under the provisions of the Consti-
tution and Rules of the Board of Governors of the New York Stock Exchange
or pursuant to the Code of Arbitration of the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers, as the undersigned may elect.
Brener v. Becker Paribas, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). Section 2 of the Act provides: "A written provision in. . . a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract. . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Id. at § 2;
see also Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 279,
292 & n.88 (1984).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982). Known as the anti-fraud provision, § 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national exchange or any security not so registered, any manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985). Rule 10b-5, promulgated pursuant to § 10(b), defines
activities which violate § 10(b). The rule provides:
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This conflict between rights to sue created under federal securi-
ties laws and waivers of those rights in arbitration agreements is
some thirty years old. Since the Supreme Court decided Wilko v.
Swan5 in 1953, federal courts have held that the Securities Ex-
change Act of 19340 as well as the Securities Act of 19337 guarantee
investors the right to sue brokers in federal court-without regard
to an arbitration agreement." The Court premised its decision in
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality, of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
5. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982). Most investors bring claims under the Exchange Act
rather than the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982). The Exchange Act regulates
post-issuance securities trading, which includes the usual investor-broker transactions. The
Securities Act applies to the initial issuance of securities, in which individual investors gen-
erally do-not participate. Investors rely primarily on rule 10b-5 in particular because it cov-
ers many of the limitless possibilities for fraudulent activites relating to investment
securities.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982).
8. In Wilko the Court guaranteed investors the right to sue under § 12(2) of the Securi-
ties Act, 346 U.S. at 438; see infra text accompanying notes 18-20. Section 12(2) provides
expressly for private damage remedies. See Pub. L. No. 73-22 § 12(2), 48 Stat. 74, 84 (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982)).
The Exchange Act provides for private damage remedies in three provisions:
Section 9(e) . . . confers a private right of action upon an injured investor
against one who has willfully engaged in market manipulation of securities
subject to the 1934 Act's registration and reporting requirements by virtue of
being listed on a national exchange. [15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1982)] Section 18(a)
• . . sets out a private right of action for an investor who has been injured due
to reliance on materially misleading statements or omissions of material facts
in documents required to be filed with the commission. [15 U.S.C. § 78r(a)
(1982)] Section 16(b)'s disgorgement of insider short-swing profits is the third
express private remedy [15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982)] . ...
T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SEcuRrms REGULATION § 13.2 (1985).
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act does not provide for a private damage remedy. See 15
U.S.C. § 78j (1982); supra note 3. Federal courts, however, have recognized an implied pri-
vate remedy based on this section and rule 10b-5 for nearly 40 years. See, e.g., Superinten-
dent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1970); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); infra text accompanying notes 31-35. Significantly, a con-
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Wilko on the notion that the investor-protection policy underlying
the Securities Act of 1933 outweighed the competing policy of pro-
moting arbitration of commercial disputes embodied in the Arbi-
tration Act.'
In 1985, however, the Supreme Court called into question the
longstanding application of Wilko to the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934. Even though the decision in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
Byrd10 did not address directly the enforcement of arbitration
agreements in disputes involving 1934 Act claims, the Court, in
dicta, and Justice White, in his concurrence, implied that arbitra-
tion agreements may be enforceable against investors alleging sec-
tion 10(b) and rule 10b-5 violations.11 Almost immediately, federal
courts began relying on Byrd to compel arbitration of section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 claims.12 The number of courts enforcing agree-
ments grew rapidly, although a substantial minority of district
courts continued to refuse to compel arbitration. In April 1986, the
Byrd-induced wave of arbitration cases first reached the appellate
level. Reversing the trend among the lower courts, five circuit
courts held that federal courts could not require arbitration of rule
tinuous line of circuit court decisions has extended Wilko's guarantee of a right of action for
investors subject to arbitration agreements to section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 claims.
Courts also have recognized implied rights of action under sections 14(a) and 14(e) of the
Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a), (e) (1982). Section 14(a) is similar to section 10(b) in
that the rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission define statutory
violations. As section 14(a) regulates the solicitation of proxies, rule 14a-9 prohibits material
misstatements, omissions, and fraud in connection with the solicitation of proxies. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-9. The private damage action under section 14(a) arises for violation of rule 14a-9.
See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
Section 14(e), which prohibits material misstatements, omissions, and fraudulent practice
in connection with tender offers, differs from both sections 10(b) and 14(a) in that the stat-
ute is self-executing; violations of rules are unnecessary for statutory violations. See 15
U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). Although shareholders and management of target companies may
seek relief under section 14(e), see, e.g., Schiesinger Inv. Partnership v. Fluor Corp., 671
F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1982) (shareholder damage suit); Prudential Real Estate Trust v. John-
camp Realty, 599 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1979) (management suit for injunctive relief), compet-
ing offerors lack standing to sue. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
This Note concentrates on the implied right of action under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5,
as the actions under sections 14(a) and 14(e) generally do not arise in the investor-broker
context.
9. 346 U.S. at 438.
10. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
11. Id. at 215 n.1; Id. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
12. See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
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10b-5 claims. 13 Only two circuit courts enforced agreements to ar-
bitrate such claims.14 As the divergence among district and circuit
courts indicates, the Byrd decision created fundamental uncer-
tainty. Byrd has reopened debate between the two powerful com-
peting public policies of investor protection and efficient dispute
resolution. To resolve this conflict, the Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari in McMahon v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc.1 5
This Note traces briefly the development of the Wilko doctrine
denying enforcement of arbitration agreements in investor-broker
disputes. It then analyzes the challenge to Wilko raised in Byrd
and its progeny, and evaluates the legal and policy arguments con-
cerning arbitration of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 claims. The
Note concludes that federal courts should not be lured into enforc-
ing arbitration agreements for the sake of efficiency. They instead
should continue to follow the longstanding precedent guaranteeing
investors the right to bring Securities Exchange Act claims in fed-
eral court. The Note proposes that Congress amend the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to create an express private right of action
for Securities Exchange Act claims. The amended statute should
provide also that an arbitration agreement would be enforceable
only if the agreement were optional, if the broker fully apprised
the investor of the federal rights he or she waived by signing, and
if the size of a subsequent dispute failed to meet a specified mini-
mum dollar amount.
13. See Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir.
1986); King v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 796 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1986), petition for cert.
filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3152 (U.S. Aug. 25, 1986) (No. 86-282); Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986); Miller v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 850
(11th Cir. 1986); McMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
14. Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1986);
Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393 (8th Cir. 1986) (2-1
decision).
15. 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986). Petitions for certiorari were
filed in King v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 796 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1986), petition for
cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3152 (U.S. Aug. 25, 1986) (No. 86-282), and Intre Sport Ltd. v.
Kidder, Peabody & Co., 625 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd without opinion, 795 F.2d 1004
(2d Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3023 (U.S. July 16, 1986) (No. 86-40).
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THE Wilko DOCTRINE
In Wilko v. Swan,"6 the Supreme Court faced the issue of
whether the Securities Act of 1933 invalidated arbitration agree-
ments between investors and brokers. Section 12(2) guarantees an
investor's right to sue his or her broker in federal court for making
false and misleading statements relating to the sale of a security in
a public offering. 1 The question in Wilko was whether the defend-
ant broker could avoid litigation by invoking an arbitration agree-
ment his customer signed at the beginning of their relationship.
The Court refused to enforce the agreement, relying on section
14 of the Act, which provides that "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive com-
pliance with any provision of this subchapter. . . shall be void.""8
The Court reasoned that "the right to select a judicial forum is the
kind of 'provision' that cannot be waived under section 14 of the
Securities Act."'19 Enforcing an arbitration agreement forces an in-
vestor to surrender the section 12(2) right to sue the broker, thus
violating section 14. The Court therefore invalidated such
agreements.2
The Court in Wilko emphasized Congress's reasons for guaran-
teeing investors the right to sue brokers. Individual investors typi-
cally suffer from a weak bargaining position when dealing with.
brokers. Investors usually know less about the risks involved in se-
curities transactions and so are less able to anticipate the likeli-
hood of a dispute.21 In addition, because they must sign an arbitra-
tion agreement before doing business, investors cannot determine
the advantages they surrender by waiving the right to sue the bro-
16. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
17. Section 12(2) provides that the seller of a security "shall be liable to the person
purchasing such security" if he or she offers or sells the security by means of "an untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading."
Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74, 84 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982)).
18. Id. at § 77n.
19. 346 U.S. at 435.
20. Id. at 438.
21. Id. at 435.
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ker; investors cannot foresee whether arbitration or legal action
will better serve their interests in a future dispute.22
At a policy level, Wilko represented a confrontation between two
opposing public interests: efficient dispute resolution, as embodied
in the Arbitration Act, and investor protection, as provided by the
Securities Act of 1933.23 In the Arbitration Act, Congress sought to
encourage settlement of commercial disputes by arbitration.2 4 Con-
gress recognized that arbitration is usually less costly and less
time-consuming than litigation and that arbitration lightens the
judicial case load. The Arbitration Act explicitly reverses the tradi-
tional judicial reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements.26
Under the Act, agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and en-
forceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract. ' '26
The Securities Act of 1933, on the other hand, resolves investor-
broker disputes through litigation. Congress believed that the safe-
guards of a trial are necessary to protect customers from the seri-
ous harm that could result from securities fraud .27 By barring en-
forcement of arbitration agreements, the Court in Wilko resolved
this conflict of policies in favor of the Securities Act, creating an
exception to the nonjudicial dispute resolution favored in the Arbi-
tration Act.28
22. Id.
23. Id. at 438. Professor Louis Loss, in his treatise on securities regulation, observed that
Wilko "presented a neat conflict between two socially desirable policies-arbitration with its
advantages of speed and economy, and protection of the rights of investors against persons
with superior bargaining power." L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1192
(1983).
24. HR. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924). The Supreme Court has affirmed
this "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration" on several occasions. Moses H. Cone Memo-
rial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); accord Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3353-54 (1985).
25. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3353-54.
26. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
27. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933). The Court made this point in Wilko. 346
U.S. at 430-31.
28. 346 U.S. at 438.
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AFTER Wilko
Federal courts have recognized a private cause of action under
rule 10b-5 since 1947 .2 Now firmly embedded in federal securities
law, the private cause of action arose from judicial cognizance of
congressional intent to provide investors complete relief from the
proscribed activities.* Eventually, the Supreme Court approved
the overwhelming tide of lower court precedent recognizing private
remedies under rule 10b-5.31
At the same time that private remedies under rule 10b-5 began
to develop, a majority of federal circuit courts held also that Wilko
guaranteed investors subject to an otherwise enforceable arbitra-
tion agreement the right to assert rule 10b-5 claims in federal
courts.2 These cases dramatically extended Wilko's reach because
the bulk of securities litigation now involves investor claims alleg-
ing violations of rule 10b-5. The courts reasoned that the non-
waiver provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 193433 protected
29. E.g., Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir.
1984); Delancie v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 648 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1981); Mansbach v. Prescott,
Ball & Turban, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1978); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558
F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,.
434 U.S. 824 (1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976); see also Katsoris, supra note 2, at 297-98; Krause,
Securities Litigation: The Unsolved Problem of Predispute Arbitration Agreements for
Pendent Claims, 29 DE PAuL L. Rav. 693, 704 (1980); Note, The Severability of Arbitrable
and Nonarbitrable Securities Claims, 41 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 1165, 1172 (1984).
30. E.g., Ayres, 538 F.2d at 536 (waiver of the right to trial is inconsistent with Congress's
investor protection policy expressed in both the 1933 and 1934 Acts); see also Reader v.
Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111, 114-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (Congress's 1933 Act intention to
provide investors with a private right of action carries over to the 1934 Act).
31. E.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (citing earlier cases) ("the
existence of a private cause of action for violations of [§ 10(b)] and ... Rule [10b-5] is now
well established."); see also L. Loss, supra note 23, at 1195.
32. See, e.g., Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir.
1984); Delancie v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 648 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1981); Mansbach v. Prescott,
Ball & Turban, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1978); Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558
F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 824 (1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,-Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
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the implied right of action against the effect of an arbitration
agreement, as much as if Congress had granted the right textu-
ally.3 4 Accordingly, these courts refused to enforce arbitration of
10(b) and 10b-5 claims.
Congress tacitly approved this judicial interpretation of its in-
tent in 1975, when the House and Senate undertook a comprehen-
sive revision of the Securities Exchange Act. A conference commit-
tee report stated plainly that Congress believed Wilko applied to
the Exchange Act and prohibited enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments in 10(b) and 10b-5 claims. "[T]he clear understanding of the
conferees [was] that this amendment did not change existing law,
as articulated in Wilko v. Swan, concerning the effect of arbitra-
tion proceeding provisions in agreements entered into by persons
dealing with members and participants of self-regulatory
organizations."3 5
For many years the Supreme Court also tacitly recognized the
circuit courts' extension of Wilko to the Securities Exchange Act
by repeatedly denying certiorari in lower court cases that extended
Wilko to the Exchange Act .3 The Court's refusal to consider the
issue enabled the lower federal courts to develop a substantial
body of case law denying enforcement of arbitration agreements in
claims -brought under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.31
The Supreme Court finally addressed the conflict between the
implied right of action and the enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.38 In Scherk, the parties had
signed an arbitration agreement prior to engaging in an interna-
tional commercial transaction. The Court enforced the parties' ar-
bitration agreement because the international dispute would have
been very difficult to settle otherwise.3 Although it did not decide
34. See, e.g., Sibley, 543 F.2d at 543 n.3; Ayres, 538 F.2d at 536-37.
35. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 321, 342 (citation omitted); see Stansbury & Klein, The Arbitration
of Investor-Broker Disputes: A Summary of Developments, 35 ARB. J. 30, 35 (Sept. 1980).
36. E.g., Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977); Sib-
ley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977); Ayres v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), cert. denied 429 U.S.
1010 (1976).
37. Stansbury & Klein, supra note 35, at 34.
38. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
39. Id. at 515-16.
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the question directly, the Court also implied in dicta that the
Wilko holding should not extend to the Exchange Act. The Court
emphasized that the 1934 Act did not create expressly a private
right of action as the 1933 Act did in section 12(2).40 Accordingly,
the Court indicated that even though federal case law had estab-
lished an implied right of action for section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
claims, that right was not a "provision" of the Exchange Act to
which the nonwaiver provision of the Act, section 29(a), applied.41
Lower federal courts, however, did not follow the Court's sugges-
tion that Wilko did not extend to the Exchange Act. The courts
usually distinguished Scherk on the grounds that it concerned an
international transaction.42 The lower courts acknowledged the Su-
preme Court's dictum pointing out the differences in the terms of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts.43 They nevertheless concluded that the
similarities between the Acts outweighed their differences, and
therefore continued to hold that Wilko prohibited enforcement of
arbitration agreements in connection with Exchange Act claims.44
40. Id. at 513.
41. Id. at 514.
42. "The position of the plaintiff in the instant suit, however, can hardly be analogized to
the posture of Alberto-Culver Company. The contract signed was defendant's 'Standard Op-
tion Agreement' and there are no international considerations at play as were present in
Scherk." Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 835 (7th
Cir. 1977).
43. E.g., Weissbuch, 558 F.2d at 835; Sibley, 543 F.2d at 543.
44. Although a "'colorable argument can be made' that Wilko ... should not apply to
arbitration of judicially implied causes of action under the 1934 Act ... [w]e are not...
persuaded that either the differences between the rights granted in the 1933 and 1934 Acts
or any consideration of policy warrant such a distinction." Ayres, 538 F.2d at 536 (quoting
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513).
Despite having declined to enforce standard investor-broker arbitration agreements, fed-
eral courts have carved out exceptions to the Wilko doctrine. See L. Loss, supra note 23, at
1193-94. Wilko applies only to predispute agreements. It does not prevent enforcement of
an agreement to arbitrate an existing dispute. E.g., Malena v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,492 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 18,
1984); see also Katsoris, supra note 2, at 295. An investor choosing to arbitrate an existing
dispute is in a better position to assess the value of arbitration than an investor who agrees
to arbitrate in advance of any dispute. Also, Wilko does not prevent enforcement of agree-
ments when the investor is experienced in securities trading and the parties deal at arm's
length. Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1972); see L. Loss,
supra note 23, at 1194; Krause, supra note 29, at 703 n.58; Peloso, Agreements to Arbitrate,
13 REv. SEC. REG. 943, 946-47 (1980). An investor with business sophistication is able to
make an informed choice whether to waive his or her federal right of action by signing an
arbitration agreement. Neither of these exceptions, however, alters Wilko's application to
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DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC. V. BYRD
In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,45 the Supreme Court
again has questioned the circuit court precedent barring enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements in Exchange Act claims. Although
the Court did not address the issue directly, the majority opinion,
and especially Justice White's concurring opinion, cast doubt on
Wilko's applicability to causes of action under the 1934 Act.
The issue in Byrd was whether to compel arbitration of state
securities law claims pendent to federal claims under the Exchange
Act.46 Byrd sued in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of California, alleging violations of sections 10(b),
15(c), and 20 of the Exchange Act, as well as state-law violations.47
He claimed that Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., had "churned"48 his
account. When he invested with the defendant, Byrd had signed an
agreement that contained a standard provision mandating arbitra-
tion of any future controversy arising out of the contract. Dean
Witter relied on this agreement in its motion to sever Byrd's state
claims and compel their arbitration, and to stay arbitration until
the court resolved Byrd's Exchange Act claims.49
Prior to Byrd the circuit courts had split over whether to sever
federal and state securities fraud claims in order to allow arbitra-
tion of state claims pendent to inarbitrable federal claims. Three
circuits endorsed a doctrine of severance and ordered arbitration of
the state claims when the parties had signed an arbitration agree-
ment.5 0 Three other circuits held that when federal and state
the majority of Exchange Act claims, which involve agreements signed in advance by inex-
perienced investors.
45. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
46. Id. at 214.
47. Byrd invested $160,000 with Dean Witter in 1981. Within an eight-month period Byrd
lost $100,000. Id.
48. "Churning occurs when a securities broker enters into transactions and manages a
client's account for the purpose of generating commissions and in disregard of his client's
interests." Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 324 (5th Cir. 1981).
49. 470 U.S. at 215.
50. See Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir.
1984); Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983); Dickinson v. Heinold
Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981).
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claims are intertwined sufficently, federal courts should deny arbi-
tration of the state claims and try all the claims together. 1
In Byrd, the Supreme Court resolved the split in favor of sever-
ance. It held that district courts must enforce arbitration agree-
ments with respect to pendent state-law claims.52 Byrd's primary
significance with respect to the enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments in Exchange Act claims lies in its dicta. In a footnote outlin-
ing the development of the Wilko doctrine, the Court observed
that "the question whether Wilko applies to section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 claims is not properly before us."15 3 Because Dean Wit-
ter had not attempted to compel arbitration of Byrd's Exchange
Act claims, the Court declined to resolve the question.5 Justice
White, however, developed this "question" in an influential
concurrence.
Justice White asserted that Wilko's prohibition of arbitration of
investor claims under the Securities Act "cannot be mechanically
transplanted to the 1934 Act."' 55 He acknowledged that both the
1933 and 1934 Acts contain nonwaiver provisions; section 14 of the
Securities Act and section 29(a) of the Exchange Act void any
agreement by which an investor surrenders any right created by
other provisions of the Act.56 Two other key provisions of the Se-
curities Act, however, "are imperfect or absent altogether" in the
Exchange Act.57 The 1934 Act limits jurisdiction for claims to fed-
eral court, whereas the 1933 Act creates state court jurisdiction as
well.58 More importantly, Justice White emphasized, the Exchange
Act does not authorize explicitly a private cause of action for in-
51. See Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 726 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 470 U.S.
213 (1985); Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023 (11th Cir.
1982); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981).
52. 470 U.S. at 218.
53. Id. at 215 n.1.
54. Id. at 215.
55. Id. at 224-25 (White, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 224.
57. Id. at 224-25. Justice White was repeating the Court's observations from Scherk.
58. Compare Exchange Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982) ("The district courts of the
United States ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter.. . .") with
Securities Act § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1982) ("The district courts of the United States
... shall have jurisdiction, concurrent with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in eq-
uity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this
subchapter.").
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vestors.59 Building upon doubts first expressed in Scherk v. Al-
berto-Culver Co.,"0 Justice White noted that denial of implied in-
vestor rights of action under the Exchange Act through
enforcement of arbitration agreements does not abrogate any pro-
vision of the Act. 1 He concluded that the question of whether
Wilko prevents arbitration of 1934 Act claims "remains open and
the contrary holdings of the lower courts must be viewed with
some doubt. '62
THE INITIAL REACTION: CONFUSION IN THE DISTRICT COURTS
Byrd resulted in a flurry of activity in federal district courts.
Soon after the decision, a majority of district courts applied Byrd
to enforce agreements to arbitrate 10(b) and 10b-5 claims, often
breaking with circuit court precedent.8 3 After tracing the develop-
59. 470 U.S. at 224-25 (White, J., concurring).
60. 417 U.S. 506 (1974); see supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
61. 470 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Fisher v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 635 F. Supp. 234 (D. Md. 1986); Baker
v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 419 (D.N.J. 1986); Shotto v. Laub,
632 F. Supp. 516 (D. Md. 1986); Sulit v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 92,755 (Mar. 27, 1986); Brener v. Becker Paribas, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Ban v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Moncrieff v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Mich.
1985); Finkle & Ross v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1505 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Prawer v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 642 (D. Mass. 1985); Geller v. Nasser,
[1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,409 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 1985);
Peele v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 620 F. Supp. 61 (W.D. Mo. 1985); Ross v. Mathis, [1985-
1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,343 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 11, 1985); Land v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Va. 1985); Marx v. Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 92,311 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 23,
1985); West v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 26 (W.D. Wash. 1985); Jarvis v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1146 (D. Vt. 1985); Johnson v. Kidder, Peabody &
Co., No. 85 CV-178 (N.D.N.Y. July 30, 1985); Colangelo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
[1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,365 (M.D. Fla. July 23, 1985);
Walch v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
S 92,060 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 1985); Hashemi v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
No. C82-2948A (N.D. Ga. July 31, 1985); Dees v. Distenfield, 618 F. Supp. 123 (C.D. Cal.
1985); Driscoll v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 625 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Fla. 1985);
Ackerman v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., No. 84-6737-Civ (S.D. Fla. May 14, 1985);
Sevinor v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 84-3240-N (D. Mass. July 19,
1985); Coonly v. Rotan Mosle, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Tex. 1985); Westwind Transp. v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 84-734 Civ-T10 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 19, 1985);
Boyd v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 218 (S.D. Fla.), on reh'g,
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ment of the Wilko doctrine through the Byrd decision, the courts
characteristically rested their holdings on two points: Justice
White's argument that Wilko's reasoning could not be extended to
the Exchange Act because the 1934 Act lacked a counterpart to
section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, which creates an express private
right of action; 4 and recent Supreme Court decisions affirming the
"strong national policy favoring arbitration. ' 6 These lower courts
therefore interpreted the Byrd decision, and especially Justice
White's concurrence in that decision, as articulating a preference
for enforcement of investor-broker arbitration agreements in
claims based on an implied right of action under the 1934 Act.6
A minority of district courts disagreed, however, and continued
to deny enforcement of arbitration agreements.6 These courts
pointed out that in Byrd, as both the Court and Justice White had
614 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Houlihan v. John Schmacker & Smith, Moore & Co., 621
F. Supp. 48 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Finn v. Davis, 610 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Mann v.
Foster & Marshall/Am. Express, Inc., No. C84-925D (W.D. Wash. June 3, 1985); Greenstein
v. First Biscayne Corp., No. 82-054-Civ (S.D. Fla. May 16, 1985); Raiford v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,269
(N.D. Ga. May 16, 1985); Niven v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 92,059 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 1985); Gregory v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 84-1647-T-10 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 1985).
64. E.g., Ilan v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 886, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Mon-
crieff v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1005, 1007 (E.D. Mich.
1985); Prawer v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 642, 645 (D. Mass. 1985).
65. E.g., Ilan, 632 F. Supp. at 888; Moncrieff, 623 F. Supp. at 1006-07; Prawer, 626 F.
Supp. at 646.
66. See, e.g., Moncrieff v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1005
(E.D. Mich. 1985); Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1985-1986
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,269 (N.D. Ga. May 16, 1985).
67. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sheets, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1169 (W.D.N.Y. July 23,
1986); Hubbard v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,869
(W.D.N.Y. July 15, 1986); Kalali v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 637 F. Supp. 1131 (D.D.C.
1986); Bustamante v. Rotan Mosle, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 303 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Levine v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1391 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Leone v. Advest,
Inc., 624 F. Supp. 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Baker v. Powell, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,407 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 1985); Adams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,328 (W.D. Okla.
Sept. 20, 1985); Green v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., No. 85-1368 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 1985);
Scharp v. Cratin, No. 85-631-Civ (S.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 1985); Rojas Cancanon v. Smith Bar-
ney, Harris Upham & Co., 612 F. Supp. 996 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Gibson v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fanner & Smith, Inc., No. 84 C 7542 (N.D. Ill. Jun 18, 1985); Dini v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., No. CA 84-4138-T (D. Mass. May 22, 1985); Weizman v. Adornato, 625 F.
Supp. 1101 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., 613 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
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acknowledged, the issue of the arbitrability of 1934 Act claims was
not before the Court and that the Court had declined explicitly to
rule whether Wilko's bar to arbitration of Securities Act claims ap-
plied to Exchange Act claims.6 8 In addition, these courts empha-
sized that Justice White's opinion, which so sharply questioned the
extension of Wilko to prevent arbitration of 1934 Act claims, was
only a concurrence. These district courts therefore elected not to
break with the long line of pre-Byrd circuit court cases that had
refused to order arbitration of Exchange Act claims.6 9
THE CIRCUIT COURTS DIVIDE
One year after the Supreme Court decided Byrd, a case involv-
ing the enforceability of arbitration agreements in 1934 Act im-
plied rights of action claims reached the circuit court level. In Mc-
Mahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,70 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs pursu-
ing 10(b) and 10b-5 claims are not required to submit to arbitra-
tion. Within six months, courts in the Third, Fifth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits adopted similar positions."' The United States
Courts of Appeals for the First and Eighth Circuits dissented, how-
ever, holding that courts should enforce agreements to arbitrate
Exchange Act claims. 2 This weight of authority against arbitration
has reversed the trend among the district courts to enforce arbitra-
tion agreements.
The five circuit courts that refused to enforce arbitration agree-
ments shared a belief that the Supreme Court's suggestion in Byrd
68. See, e.g., Leone v. Advest, Inc., 624 F. Supp. 297, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Adams v. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 92,328, at 92,174 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 20, 1985).
69. E.g., Leone, 624 F. Supp. at 302; Baker v. Powell, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,407, at 92,504-05 (D.N.J. Nov. 26, 1985); Adams, [1985-1986 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,238, at 92,174.
70. 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
71. Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir. 1986);
King v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 796 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed,
55 U.S.L.W. 3152 (U.S. Aug. 25, 1986) (No. 86-282); Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986); Miller v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 850 (11th
Cir. 1986).
72. Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291 (1st Cir. 1986);
Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393 (8th Cir. 1986).
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that 1934 Act claims might be arbitrable did not prevent the con-
tinued application of established circuit court precedent against
enforcement of arbitration agreements. The courts acknowledged
that Justice White had cast some doubt on the judicial refusal to
enforce arbitration of 10(b) and 10b-5 claims, but in an opinion
which was after all only a concurrence."3 Furthermore, these courts
stressed that clear circuit court precedent controlled over Supreme
Court dicta that indicated a possible preference to the contrary.74
The controlling cases in these five circuits, as well as in virtually
every other circuit, held that courts should not enforce arbitration
of 10(b) and 10b-5 claims. 75 As Judge Timbers wrote in McMahon,
the courts refused to "speculat[e] as to what the Supreme Court
may do with our settled law."'76
In the most fully reasoned of the five opinions, Conover v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc.,17 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit turned to the legislative history of the 1933 and 1934
Acts to counter the implication in Byrd that 10(b) and 10b-5
claims should be arbitrated. Justice White had contended that the
Wilko bar to arbitration of 1933 Act claims could not be "mechani-
cally transplanted" to 1934 Act claims because the latter Act did
not create an express private right of action.78 The court in Cono-
ver, however, found that an express right of action was not neces-
sary. Judge Schroeder determined that the judicially established
right to pursue damage claims for 10(b) and 10b-5 violations in
federal court was so thoroughly accepted that it could not be
waived.79 Judge Schroeder observed that both Congress and the
SEC had recognized that an agreement to arbitrate should not
deny the investor's right to litigate 1934 Act claims.80
73. E.g., McMahon, 788 F.2d at 97.
74. E.g., Miller, 791 F.2d at 854; King, 796 F.2d at 60.
75. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
76. McMahon, 788 F.2d at 97.
77. 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 55-62.
79. 794 F.2d at 524.
80. Id.; see also Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) T 82,122 (July 2, 1979); supra note 35 and accompanying text.
The SEC reversed its position recently in an amicus brief filed in the McMahon case
before the Supreme Court. The SEC now maintains that predispute arbitration agreements
are enforceable, reasoning that the Commission's extensive power to regulate the arbitration
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The court in Conover found additional support in recent Su-
preme Court decisions. The Supreme Court had stated previously
that the 1933 and 1934 Acts "constitute interrelated components
of the federal regulatory scheme governing transactions in securi-
ties," '81 and should be given "'a cumulative construction' which
'furthers their broad remedial purpose.' "s In Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, s the Court concluded that "the existence of a private
cause of action for violations of the statute [10(b)] and the Rule
[10b-5] is now well established. '8 4
The Ninth Circuit found other reasons not to enforce arbitration
of Exchange Act claims as well. The court cited Wilko for the pro-
position that securities disputes are more properly treated in a
trial than in arbitration. 5 A court proceeding provides procedural
safeguards unavailable in arbitration, arbitrators are not trained in
the law, and arbitrators need not keep a complete record of their
proceedings.8 The court also noted that the Arbitration Act does
not authorize enforcement of all types of arbitration agreements;
Congress may identify certain classes of disputes as inarbitrable8 s
The court in Conover held that the congressional policy of investor
protection underlying both the 1933 and 1934 Acts implies a pri-
vate cause of action under the 1934 Act, and empowers investors to
procedures of the stock exchanges and other self-regulatory organizations enables it to pro-
tect investors' 1933 and 1934 Act rights. Brief for the Securities & Exchange Comm'n as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14-18, Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon
(U.S. 1986) (No. 86-44) (oral argument Mar. 3, 1987).
81. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976).
82. Conover, 794 F.2d at 525 (quoting Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375,
386 (1983)).
83. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
84. Id. at 196.
85. 794 F.2d at 526 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435-36 (1953)).
86. See infra notes 116-119 and accompanying text.
87. The court in Conover stated:
Just as it is the congressional policy manifested in the federal Arbitration Act
that requires courts liberally to construe the scope of arbitration agreements
covered by the [sic] Act, it is the congressional intention expressed in some
other statute on which the courts must rely to identify any category of claims
as to which agreements to arbitrate will be held unenforceable.
794 F.2d at 522 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S.
Ct. 3346, 3355 (1985)).
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resolve 10(b) and 10b-5 claims in federal court rather than through
arbitration.""
The United States Courts of Appeals for the First and Eighth
Circuits refused to follow this reasoning. Judge Bright, writing for
the Eighth Circuit in Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc.,8s found Justice White's concurrence in Byrd persua-
sive. Acknowledging that he was at odds with other circuit courts,
Judge Bright held that differences between the provisions of the
1933 and 1934 Acts, coupled with a strong federal policy favoring
arbitration, prevent courts from extending the Wilko bar to Ex-
change Act claims.90 Courts therefore should enforce agreements to
arbitrate 10(b) and 10b-5 claims.
The inconsistent but vigorous response of the district and circuit
courts to Byrd demonstrates that the enforceability of arbitration
agreements in Exchange Act claims is no longer settled. Many of
the courts seized on the Court's dicta to enforce arbitration agree-
ments, while others rejected this new direction. These sharply di-
vergent interpretations of Byrd reflect a dispute over the relative
importance of underlying policy goals. The Court has revived a
deep-seated conflict between investor protection from securities
fraud and efficient dispute resolution through arbitration.
ANALYSIS OF THE COMPETING POLICIES: EFFICIENCY V. INVESTOR
PROTECTION
Efficiency
Courts and commentators agree that arbitration saves time and
money over litigation and therefore provides a more efficient
means of dispute resolution.9 1 This efficiency has become increas-
ingly important in the securities industry because public invest-
ment has grown rapidly in recent years. The number of investor-
88. 794 F.2d at 525.
89. 795 F.2d 1393 (8th Cir. 1986).
90. The court stated: "We hold, then, that Congress has not evinced an intention to pre-
clude the waiver of judicial remedies for the section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 rights at issue
here." Id. at 1398.
91. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953). One commentator, discussing the
importance of speedy dispute resolution, asserts that "[d]elay can be tantamount to a denial
of due process." Krause, supra note 29, at 720-21.
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broker disputes has grown proportionately, s2 and investors and
brokers increasingly have employed arbitration to settle their dis-
putes rather than undertake the expense and delay of a trial.9 3
The well-established application of the Wilko doctrine to Ex-
change Act claims, which renders them inarbitrable, raises the po-
tential for inefficiency when litigants combine those federal claims
with state-law claims. Such "mixed claims" occur when a federal
court acquires pendent jurisdiction over state-law claims arising
from the same transaction that produced federal securities law
claims. Mixed state and federal claims are common because plain-
tiff investors often add 10(b) and 10b-5 counts to their common-
law fraud or breach of contract claims in order to get into federal
court. In addition, some plaintiffs attempt to avoid arbitration by
asserting inarbitrable federal claims.9'
Prior to Byrd, courts resolved such mixed claims in one of two
ways. In one approach, courts severed the state claims from the
federal claims and either ordered arbitration of those state claims
according to the terms of the parties' agreement, or stayed arbitra-
tion until after litigation of the federal claims. 5 The federal claims
were tried separately. In a second approach, known as the "inter-
twining" doctrine, courts tried both state and federal claims to-
gether if the claims were so intertwined that separation was im-
practical.98 By considering the claims together, courts were able to
provide a reasonably efficient method of resolving the entire
dispute.
92. Investors filed 3,000 securities claims in federal district courts between Mar. 31, 1983,
and Mar. 31, 1984. Katsoris, supra note 2, at 279 n.5 (citing STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND RE-
PORTS DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORK-
LOAD STATISTICS A-9 (1984)).
93. In 1980, 830 investors and brokers initiated arbitration proceedings; in 1983, the num-
ber increased to 1,731. Id. at 279-80 n.7; see also D. Lipton, Arbitration in the Securities
Industry: Too Much of a Good Thing? 3 (unpublished study on file with the National Insti-
tute for Dispute Resolution, Washington, D.C.).
94. Katsoris, supra note 2, at 305 & n.202.
95. Id. at 302-03; Peloso, supra note 44, at 948-50. See generally Note, Mixed Arbitrable
and Nonarbitrable Claims in Securities Litigation: Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., v. Byrd, 34
CATH. U. L. REV. 525 (1985); Note, Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., v. Byrd: The Unraveling of
the Intertwining Doctrine, 62 DEN. U. L. REV. 789 (1985).
96. Katsoris, supra note 2, at 303-04 (citing Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 544 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977)); Peloso, supra note 44, at 948-49.
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The Supreme Court in Byrd rejected the intertwining doctrine
and followed the first approach, holding that state-law claims must
be severed from federal claims and then arbitrated.97 In so doing
the Court increased the inefficiency of resolving disputes involving
inarbitrable Exchange Act claims. Courts frequently have trouble
distinguishing state law claims from federal securities law claims
when both arise from a single securities transaction. 8 As a result,
courts waste time determining which claims to sever for arbitration
and which to retain for trial. The Byrd holding forces lower courts
to continue this awkward procedure, and prevents them from sim-
ply hearing all claims when the allegations are indistinguishable.
Byrd also creates the potential for duplication of effort in resolv-
ing securities disputes. When a court severs similar state and fed-
eral claims, the state arbitration proceeding and the federal trial
cover similar ground, determining similar questions of fact. Under
Byrd, a court cannot stay arbitration of state claims until litigation
of federal claims is complete.9 Such parallel proceedings defeat
the federal policy of pendent jurisdiction, which promotes judicial
economy by resolving related state and federal issues in a single
forum.100 Not only does the holding in Byrd increase inefficiency, it
may allow other inequitable results as well.101
97. 470 U.S. at 218.
98. Katsoris, supra note 2, at 298, 303; Krause, supra note 29, at 717.
99. 470 U.S. at 223.
100. Katsoris, supra note 2, at 305 n.201; Krause, supra note 29, at 717.
101. Because federal courts and arbitrators follow different rules of procedure, evidence,
and law, separate proceedings may produce conflicting conclusions even though both actions
arose out of the same securities transaction. See infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
Mandatory severance and arbitration of pendent state claims also raises the possibility
that state arbitration findings of fact will have collateral estoppel effect on simultaneous or
subsequent litigation of federal claims. Currently, the res judicata or collateral estoppel ef-
fect of arbitration on federal securities claims is unclear because the Supreme Court has not
ruled on the issue. In Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham, Lambert, Inc., 763 F.2d 1352 (11th
Cir. 1985), the court held that in principle an arbitration decision could have preclusive
effect on subsequent securities litigation in federal court. Id. at 1360. The court in Green-
blatt noted, however, that in McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984), the
Supreme Court stated that an arbitrator's decision cannot have res judicata or collateral
estoppel effect on a civil rights action later brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court.
Greenblatt, 763 F.2d at 1360.
In Byrd, the Court was skeptical that a federal court would grant res judicata or collateral
estoppel effect to prior arbitral findings in a securities dispute. The Court said that it is "far
from certain that arbitration proceedings will have any preclusive effect on the litigation of
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Many district courts, recognizing the inefficiency inherent in the
Byrd severance approach but unable to apply the intertwining doc-
trine, attempted to resolve the inefficiency by enforcing arbitration
of all claims, state and federal.102 Enforcing arbitration agreements
with respect to both state and federal claims allows these courts to
sidestep the difficulties of resolving essentially identical claims in
separate proceedings, and so promotes quicker and less expensive
settlement of investor-broker disputes. These district courts found
support for this approach in the dicta of the majority opinion in
Byrd, and in Justice White's concurring opinion.1l 3 Many of these
district cases, however, have been reversed by the circuit courts,0
and the severance approach continues to be the prevailing ap-
proach, despite its inefficiency.
From the standpoint of pure efficiency, arbitration of both fed-
eral and state claims in a single proceeding is the preferred method
of dispute resolution.105 Because continued application of the
Wilko doctrine to Securities Exchange Act of 1934 claims pre-
cludes the arbitration of those claims, adjudication of both state
and federal claims in a single judicial forum is the next most effi-
cient method of dispute resolution. The Supreme Court's decision
in Byrd to compel arbitration of the state claims, however, invali-
nonarbitrable federal claims." 470 U.S. at 222. The court in Greenblatt concluded that the
Supreme Court seems to favor a case-by-case approach that would determine the res judi-
cata or collateral estoppel effect of arbitration on a federal court proceeding by "focusing on
the federal interests in insuring a federal court determination of the federal claim, the ex-
pertise of the arbitrator and his scope of authority under the arbitration agreement, and the
procedural adequacy of the arbitration proceeding." 763 F.2d at 1361; see Katsoris, The
Securities Arbitrators' Nightmare, 14 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 3, 9-11 (1986). Professor Katsoris
maintains that "[i]t is somewhat doubtful that a prior arbitration award would have a
preclusive effect upon subsequent litigation of a federal securities claim." Id. at 9.
102. See supra note 63.
103. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 70-88 and accompanying text.
105. Arbitration of both federal and state claims does not lead necessarily to true eco-
nomic efficiency. Assuming that streamlined arbitration proceedings are less likely to reach
the "correct" result, then the time and money saved through arbitration do not come with-
out further costs. An investor discouraged by the results of arbitration of a securities fraud
claim will limit future brokerage investment, limiting the pool of available risk capital. Fur-
thermore, brokers avoiding liability through arbitration after actually violating securities
laws will be more likely to test the limits of securities law enforcement in the future. Con-
sidering the arguable arbitration bias in light of the above, see infra text accompanying
notes 120-24, economic efficiency through arbitration is uncertain.
[Vol. 28:335
ARBITRATION OF SECURITIES CLAIMS
dates that approach, and leaves litigants to face the least efficient
scenario: dual proceedings. Whether this inefficiency and inconve-
nience is justified depends on the relative strength of another com-
pelling federal interest, the protection of investors.
Investor Protection
Despite the important Arbitration Act policy to promote effi-
cient dispute resolution, the investor protection policy of the Ex-
change Act dictates that courts should not enforce arbitration
agreements with respect to Exchange Act claims. The Supreme
Court has recognized that the Arbitration Act policy may be lim-
ited by "sufficiently compelling" contrary federal interests.106 In
Wilko the Court decided that the need to protect investors from
securities issuers' fraudulent conduct justified an exception to the
Arbitration Act.20 7 The Court therefore barred enforcement of ar-
bitration agreements as to claims brought under the Securities Act.
The shared purpose of the Exchange Act and the Securities Act
implies that Exchange Act claims likewise should be excepted from
coverage by the Arbitration Act's national policy favoring
arbitration.
Several features of arbitration agreements compromising inves-
tors' interests also point toward resolving the policy conflict in
favor of the Exchange Act's purpose of investor protection. First,
investors rarely can bargain fairly for such an agreement. The typi-
cal individual investor is in a weak bargaining position relative to
the broker with whom he or she deals. As the Court in Wilko ob-
served, investors usually know much less about the securities mar-
ket and securities trading than brokers.10 8 Investors expect, and
pay for, knowledgeable brokers; the disproportionality in knowl-
edge of securities trading, however, can disadvantage the investor
when the parties agree to the terms of their relationship.
A potential securities purchaser often does not understand fully
the risks involved in various types of investments; and the investor
is even less likely to know what constitutes unacceptable broker
conduct. The investor therefore has no clear idea of the probability
106. See, e.g., Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219.
107. 346 U.S. at 438.
108. Id. at 435.
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or nature of a dispute arising with the broker. As a result, the in-
vestor is unable to assess properly the relative advantages of arbi-
tration as opposed to litigation and make an informed decision
whether to sign an arbitration agreement.109
Second, investors suffer because often they do not read or under-
stand the contracts they sign with brokers. 110 The brokerage agree-
ment is usually a standard form in fine print with technical lan-
guage. The agreement may not feature prominently the arbitration
provision in which the investor consents to submit all disputes
with the broker to arbitration, and brokers may not take time to
identify or explain it."' Furthermore, although these agreements
probably constitute contracts of adhesion," 2 which are generally
unenforceable,"13 courts have nevertheless upheld them.1 4 Perhaps
recognizing the inequity of these provisions, the SEC recently has
109. See id. at 435; Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d
831, 835 (7th Cir. 1977) ("Lacking bargaining power and extensive information about his
investment, this type of individual is most vulnerable to securities swindles and in most
need of the special protections aid remedies afforded by the Securities laws.").
110. Stansbury & Klein, supra note 35, at 37.
111. Id. In response to this problem, the SEC urges brokers to advise prospective custom-
ers of their 1933 and 1934 Act rights before they sign an arbitration agreement. See Notice
to Broker-Dealers Concerning Clauses in Customer Agreements Which Provide for Arbitra-
tion of Future Disputes, Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 83,122 at 81,976-78 (July 2, 1979). Similarly, the Securities Industry Con-
ference on Arbitration advises investors that arbitration agreements may not be enforceable
under federal securities laws. SEcuRrrEs INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, ARBITRA-
TION PROCEDURES frontispiece (1984) [hereinafter SICA HANDBOOK].
112. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERMLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1-3, at 6 (2d ed. 1977); see
also Katsoris, supra note 101, at 11-14.
113. Courts generally will not enforce a contract of adhesion if: (1) the contract or a term
is not within the reasonable expectation of the weaker party; and/or (2) the contract or term
is unduly oppressive, unconscionable or against public policy. Katsoris, supra note 2, at 306-
07 (citing Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 820, 623 P.2d 165, 172-73, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 604, 612 (1981)); see Finkle & Ross v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1505
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 112, at § 9-44.
114. Three post-Byrd district court decisions have held that arbitration agreements are
enforceable despite their nature as contracts of adhesion, because the agreements were not
unconscionable or against public policy. Brener v. Becker Paribas, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Ilan v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Fin-
kle & Ross v. A.G. Becker Paribas, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1505 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also Surman
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 733 F.2d 59, 61 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984) ("There is
certainly nothing inherently unfair about . . . arbitration clauses, and they are therefore
valid and enforceable.").
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attempted to prohibit the inclusion of such provisions in brokerage
contracts.11 5
Finally, the arbitration process itself potentially undercuts the
interests of investors. Arbitration proceedings, for example, do not
include the procedural safeguards of a trial. Arbitrators are not
bound strictly by judicial precedent, nor must they follow formal
rules of evidence or allow pretrial discovery. 116 In addition, the
award of an arbitrator is subject only to very limited judicial re-
view.117 Review is difficult because the hearings usually do not gen-
erate a complete record,"' and arbitrators are not required to give
reasons for their awards.1 9 Investors who submit to arbitration
may find fewer avenues of appeal to vindicate Exchange Act rights
than if they had sued in federal court.
Arbitration also may be biased against investors because the sev-
eral self-regulatory organizations12 0 administer the arbitration pro-
cess. The SROs operate under the Uniform Code of Arbitration
promulgated by the Securities Industry Conference of Arbitra-
115. SEC Rule 15c2-2 states in part: "It shall be a fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive
act or practice for a broker or dealer to enter into an agreement with any public customer
which purports to bind the customer to the arbitration of future disputes between them
arising under the Federal Securities laws. . . ." 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2 (1986).
116. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974) ("[T]he usual rules of
evidence do not apply [in arbitration]; and rights and procedures common to civil trials,
such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are
often severely limited or unavailable."). See generally SICA HANDBOOK, supra note 111 (ex-
planation of arbitration procedures).
117. The Arbitration Act provides the following grounds for district courts to vacate an
award:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or ei-
ther of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing. . or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the con-
troversy ....
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers ....
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
118. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57-58; Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953). Parties
may request that a record be made at their own expense. SICA HANDBOOK, supra note 111,
at 8.
119. SICA HANDBOOK, supra note 111, at 8.
120. Four types of SROs exist: (1) the national securities exchanges, such as the New
York Stock Exchange and the Chicago Board Options Exchange; (2) the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers; (3) the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board; and (4) the Reg-
istered Clearing Agencies. L. Loss, supra note 23, at 689-98.
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tion.121 When an investor makes a complaint, the SRO of which
the broker is a member selects an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators
from a list maintained by the SRO. The Uniform Code of Arbitra-
tion requires that arbitrators not be employees of the SRO, al-
though they may work elsewhere in the securities industry.122 Al-
though the Code also prescribes that a majority of the members of
a panel be persons not employed in any capacity in the industry, 123
even the "public" arbitrators usually have or have had some asso-
ciation with the securities industry because of the expertise re-
quired to resolve investor-broker disputes. Commentators have ar-
gued, therefore, that arbitration panels are inclined to sympathize
more with a broker than an investor. 24
Arbitration agreements, then, tend to undermine investors' Ex-
change Act rights against brokers. Such agreements often are not
bargained for fairly, because of the investors' weak bargaining po-
sition, and they frequently compel investors to agree to arbitration
whether they choose to or not. Finally, the arbitration process it-
self arguably is biased against investors. In terms of investor pro-
tection, these flaws constitute a "compelling interest" sufficient to
outweigh the Arbitration Act policy of efficient dispute resolution
and suggest that Exchange Act claims should not be subject to ar-
bitration agreements.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Application of the Wilko doctrine to Exchange Act claims
presents a conflict between efficient resolution of disputes and pro-
tection of investors. Courts should resolve this conflict in favor of
investor protection by denying enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments in Exchange Act claims. Congress's policy of investor pro-
tection, embodied in the 1933 and 1934 Acts, is a sufficiently com-
121. SICA HANDBOOK, supra note 111, at 1.
122. Id. at 3; see Katsoris, supra note 2, at 310.
123. SICA HANDBOOK, supra note 111, at 3.
124. Katsoris, supra note 2, at 308-09; Krause, supra note 29, at 718; see also Hope v.
Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 147, 154, 175 Cal. Rptr. 851, 856 (1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 910 (1982) (the "structure of the governance of the [New York Stock Exchange] is such
that there exists a presumptive institutional bias in favor of member firms."). See generally
Parr v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 440, 446, 188 Cal. Rptr. 801, 805 (1983) (presump-
tion of a securities exchange's institutional bias was rebuttable).
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pelling federal interest to except Exchange Act claims from the
strong national policy favoring efficiency through arbitration. Al-
though arbitration agreements may save time and money, they
achieve this efficiency at too high a cost. Such agreements effec-
tively compel securities purchasers to give up the right to sue in
federal court for the less certain protections of arbitration. Many
courts have favored efficiency over investor protection, and thus
have enforced arbitration agreements in 1934 Act claims, by rely-
ing on the policy of efficiency set forth by the Arbitration Act. As
the Court emphasized in Byrd, however, efficiency is not the over-
riding purpose of the Arbitration Act.
Nor is the argument for enforcement based on differences be-
tween the language of the 1933 and 1934 Acts persuasive. Section
10(b) of the 1934 Exchange Act lacks the provision creating a spe-
cial right of action for investors which section 12(2) of the 1933
Securities Act contains. By strict analogy, therefore, the Wilko rea-
soning barring arbitration of 1933 Act claims does not extend to
implied rights of action under the 1934 Act. The issue of whether
to enforce arbitration agreements, however, is fundamentally one
of policy rather than statutory construction. The extent to which
arbitration agreements damage investors' rights indicates force-
fully that enforcement is not consistent with Congress's intention
to protect investors through the Exchange Act. Until the Supreme
Court decides otherwise, federal courts should continue to guaran-
tee investors the right to litigate 10(b) and 10b-5 claims, even
though they have signed an arbitration agreement.
A total ban on arbitrating investor-broker disputes, however, is
not desirable. Congress and the securities industry can take steps
to improve the resolution of investor-broker disputes by providing
for arbitration in limited situations. For its part, Congress should
amend the Exchange Act to create an express, but qualified, right
of action for investors. Generally, courts should not deny investors
this right, despite the presence of an arbitration agreement in the
brokerage contract. Congress should allow courts to enforce these
agreements, however, under three conditions. First, the agreement
must be optional; an agreement to arbitrate future disputes must
not have been a precondition to opening an account. Second, the
broker must have advised the prospective investor clearly that he
or she would lose the right to sue in federal court by signing the
1987]
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agreement. Third, the amount in dispute must be less than a speci-
fied dollar figure. 125
The first two requirements would reduce the likelihood that ar-
bitration agreements would constitute contracts of adhesion, and
would promote the fair dealing between brokers and investors
which both commentators and the SEC have urged. 126 The amount
in controversy requirement would distinguish smaller, less complex
disputes for which arbitration is suitable from larger, more compli-
cated controversies which call for the procedural advantages of a
trial.
Together, these restrictions would permit investors and brokers
to enjoy the economies of arbitration when the risks of compromis-
ing an investor's rights are low. Arbitration makes sense for rela-
tively simple disputes, so long as the investor entered an arbitra-
tion agreement freely and with full knowledge of the consequences.
In many instances, investors with smaller claims will prefer a
speedy resolution through arbitration. Investors with larger dis-
putes, on the other hand, should be guaranteed the right to sue
under the Exchange Act. They are more likely to desire, and to be
able to afford, a trial, and their claims deserve the more careful
fact finding and application of procedural safeguards available in
federal court. 127
As a related improvement, the self-regulatory organizations
should discontinue their control of the arbitration process.128 Ide-
ally, an independent forum should handle such disputes, perhaps
under the direction of the American Arbitration Association. This
step would remove the risk and appearance of conflicts of interest
125. The requisite amount might be set at, for example, $50,00C The amount should be
at least as high as the cost of litigating a fairly simple claim.
126. See Recent Developments-Federal and State Securities Claims: Litigation or Ar-
bitration?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 245, 257-58 (1986). SEC Release No. 15,984 states that
"[r]equiring the signing of an arbitration agreement without adequate disclosure as to its
meaning and effect violates standards of fair dealing with customers and constitutes conduct
that is inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade." Notice to Broker-Dealers
Concerning Clauses in Customer Agreements Which Provide for Arbitration of Future Dis-
putes, Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
82,122, at 81,978 (July 2, 1979) (footnotes omitted).
127. Investors with claims greater than the threshold amount could still request arbitra-
tion; they simply could not be forced into arbitration because they signed arbitration agree-
ments when they first entered into the brokerage contract. See supra note 44.
128. See Katsoris, supra note 101, at 14; Recent Developments, supra note 126, at 260.
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that exist under the present system, in which a broker's dispute is
arbitrated by other securities professionals. As it does now, the
SEC must continue to review whatever procedures are established
to arbitrate securities disputes. Commentators suggest also that se-
curities arbitration should employ more arbitrators who are wholly
unconnected with the industry. 129 Insofar as the complexity of a
dispute allows, the "public" arbitrators on a panel should be truly
public. They should not be present or past securities professionals.
As an alternative, those who administer arbitration might select
arbitrators from lists maintained by the American Arbitration
Association.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Byrd has caused great confusion. Lower federal
courts clearly are divided over whether to enforce agreements to
arbitrate with respect to investor claims brought under the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934. Dicta and Justice White's concurrence
in Byrd convinced many district courts to enforce arbitration
agreements despite many years of circuit court precedent to the
contrary. Five of the seven courts of appeals addressing the issue
have denied enforcement, however, apparently not persuaded that
the Supreme Court has in fact disclosed a preference for arbitra-
tion. As a result, neither brokers nor investors know whether they
will be bound by the arbitration agreements they sign.
Congress should make its intentions clear by amending the Ex-
change Act. The arbitrability of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
claims ultimately is a legislative decision. Congress should not rely
entirely on the self-regulatory organizations or the SEC to protect
investors' rights. Congress must balance the Arbitration Act's pol-
icy of efficient dispute resolution against the Exchange Act's pur-
pose of investor protection. One proposal is to establish an amount
in controversy standard that permits arbitration of smaller, fairly
straightforward disputes, but prohibits enforcement of arbitration
agreements against larger, more complex claims. The securities in-
dustry, in turn, must work toward making the arbitration process
as impartial as possible. The goal of these or similar reforms
129. Katsoris, supra note 2, at 311-12; Peloso, supra note 44, at 950.
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should be, first and foremost, to protect investors in their dealings
with brokers, and only then to encourage, so far as is consistent
with that protection, swift and economical resolution of disputes.
Michael Durrer
